Análisis del daño moral derivado de la prisión preventiva en el Ecuador.

Abstract

The concept of moral damage, in the light of Jurisprudence and Doctrine, is conceived as that detriment or suffering in extra-patrimonial goods of a person. Although it is true that this detriment is of an abstract nature, our Civil Code limits itself to classifying patrimonial damages; in the title of the crimes and quasi-felonies, reference is made simply to the damage. Based on what is indicated in the Doctrine of Moral Damage, this paper will focus on analyzing moral damage from the perspective of preventive detention ordered by a judge, in light of Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador. The fact that a detention order is lifted does not imply that it was arbitrarily, illegally or illegitimately ordered in order to give rise to Moral Damage. The focus of this paper will be on the analysis of the circumstances under which an order of deprivation of liberty can give rise to the action for moral damages provided for in the law, and the role of the State in this regard.