La inaplicabilidad del principio de doble instancia en los procesos contencioso administrativos en Ecuador.

Abstract

The right to a second instance, also known as the right to recourse, is a fundamental guarantee of the constitutional right to a defense. Its purpose is to ensure that higher courts review, considering the merits of the case, the judgments or decisions of lower court judges in order to correct any errors or arbitrary actions they may have committed during the proceedings. However, this fundamental guarantee is not applicable in all cases, including those within the jurisdiction of administrative litigation. These cases are handled by single-instance courts whose final decisions can only be challenged in cassation proceedings. In these proceedings, only the legality of the decision itself is reviewed; the evidence preceding the decision is not subject to review, except when the requirements expressly stipulated in procedural law are met. In this context, this essay aims to analyze the legal consequences of the inapplicability of the principle of double instance in contentious administrative proceedings. To this end, it will examine not only the Ecuadorian constitutional and procedural legal framework, but also national and international jurisprudence, as well as specialized legal scholarship on this matter, in order to determine alternatives that may address the difficulties presented by this issue.