La insuficiencia de las cláusulas de estabilidad jurídica frente a la potestad normativa del estado.

Abstract

Prior to the beginning of an investment, the degree of legal security that each state offers to the investor is one of the most relevant aspects to be considered. Legal security can be protected through certain mechanisms, such as legal stabilization clauses. By subscribing this type of clauses, the Sate compromises itself to not alter the rules of the game known by the investor, being its own legal system. However, under its legislative powers, the State may alter rights and obligations of the investor under the modification of a stabilized norm, applying it directly to the investor. From this perspective, there is a clash between legal stabilization clauses and their erroneous aim of limiting the State’s legislative power since such limitations are not enforceable against the State. For this reason, this paper will explore the insufficiency of legal stabilization clauses, as well as an alternative clause that will alleviate the existing tension with the State's regulatory power.