Remates judiciales en caso de quiebra sin la participación del segundo postor.

Abstract

The failure of judicial auctions in Ecuador, as the situation is called when goods cannot be awarded due to legal loopholes and, ultimately, the seizure cannot be enforced, is a recurring problem that affects both creditors and debtors. Such a scenario occurs when the preferred bidder does not deposit the offered amounts and there are no other interested parties to outbid, a situation not specifically contemplated by the General Organic Code of Processes, which generates legal uncertainty, violates constitutional rights such as due process and legal security, and unnecessarily prolongs the judicial procedures.The present analysis of the Ecuadorian regulatory framework on the matter shows that regulatory gaps grant excessive discretion to judges and perpetuate an ineffective regulatory framework. When comparing with the legislative situation in countries like Spain or Colombia, original provisions are found, such as electronic auctions and direct sales to the creditor, whose implementation will tend to overcome these deficiencies.The lack of specific regulation not only affects its effectiveness but also perpetuates inequality between the parties. The proposed reforms to require every bidder to provide a guarantee and the implementation of electronic auctions aim to ensure greater transparency, efficiency, and fairness in procedures. These reforms not only address technical issues but also ethical ones: the need to protect the procedural rights of the parties at all costs and to strengthen trust in the judicial system.