Vulneración al debido proceso en la inadmisión de pruebas en juicios de una sola instancia.

Abstract

The present research examines the issue of the inadmissibility of evidence in attorney fee proceedings governed by the Code of General Process (COGEP). Specifically, it investigates how the lack of appeal mechanisms, such as the right to appeal, may undermine the right to defense and due process. The main objective is to determine whether the procedural speed inherent to this type of trial justifies the restriction of fundamental guarantees, especially when the inadmissibility of evidence may lead to rulings that do not consider all necessary evidentiary elements to fairly resolve the dispute. To address this question, the applicable procedural rules are analyzed, including Articles 160, 165, and 333 of the COGEP, as well as the relevant case law that establishes the impossibility of appealing decisions issued in attorney fee disputes. By studying selected judicial decisions, this research demonstrates the practical significance of the matter, revealing instances where the absence of a review mechanism hinders the correction of potential errors in the admission of evidence. The findings indicate that while the legislature’s intention is to expedite these proceedings, the absolute restriction of appeals may compromise legal certainty and the parties’ fundamental rights. Based on these observations, it is proposed to reform the COGEP article 333 in order to include the possibility of appealing this kind of trials, aiming to balance procedural efficiency and effective judicial protection. This approach would safeguard essential guarantees without sacrificing the prompt resolution of conflicts. Ultimately, ensuring procedural speed and fundamental fairness remains a critical challenge for safeguarding litigants’ rights.