Crítica al segundo inciso del Art. 230.1 del Código Orgánico de la Función Judicial y su posible inconstitucionalidad.

Abstract

This research examines, from a constitutional-dogmatic and jurisprudential approach, the scope of the second paragraph of Article 230.1 of the Organic Code of the Judicial Function (COFJ), which empowers the Council of the Judiciary to “determine complementary circumstances” to assign cases to specialized or ordinary judges. It delineates the difference between protected legal interest and criminal offense definition (tipo penal), and between jurisdiction and internal case-allocation rules. Using analytical, deductive, synthetic, and hermeneutic methods, the provision is tested against the reservation of law, the natural judge, legal certainty, and the separation of functions. The discussion draws on standards of the Constitutional Court and on the conventionality block. The result shows that only a strictly organizational reading is compatible with the Constitution: the “complementary circumstances” may operationalize the law without innovating upon it, but may not create or modify jurisdiction. Any ex post, case-by-case, or discretionary reassignment violates the natural judge, the reservation of law, judicial independence, and legitimate expectations. It concludes that criminal specialization must be statutory, exhaustive, and ex ante, with ex officio verification and heightened reasoning of jurisdiction by judges. It recommends statutory precision of the specialized scope, transparency and auditability of administrative allocation, and jurisprudential consolidation of a strict test to distinguish allocation from genuine innovation in jurisdiction. The contribution is an operational framework for applying these criteria in concrete and recurring cases.