Entre una vida encarnizada por la enfermedad y la muerte digna, análisis jurídico sobre la despenalización de la eutanasia en el Ecuador.

Abstract

This essay addresses the bioethical and legal dilemma generated by euthanasia in Ecuador, where the rigidity of criminal law created a regulatory vacuum that pitted the right to life against the personal autonomy of individuals suffering from painful terminal illnesses. The analysis focuses on Sentencia No. 67-23-IN/24 of the Constitutional Court, a ruling through which constitutional control was activated, and the concept of human dignity was reformulated. The Court's rationale prioritizes the irreversible and unbearable suffering caused by terminal illnesses, allowing limited euthanasia as a legitimate exercise of individual will. The Constitutional Court declared the conditional constitutionality of Article 144 of the COIP (Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code), leading to the partial decriminalization of simple homicide. This decision generates a new ground for non-punishability for physicians who assist a patient who voluntarily and expressly requests euthanasia. It is observed that the Court redefines dignified life by including the voluntary power to access euthanasia in exceptional cases. In conclusion, the ruling marks a historical milestone by transforming the right to life from an obligation to a voluntary power, concluding with an analysis of the obligation of the National Assembly and the Ministry of Public Health to develop the necessary regulations to establish effective procedures for its implementation.