Las limitaciones del principio de dirección judicial del proceso penal en el Ecuador a la luz del sistema acusatorio contemporáneo

Abstract

basic principle applies: the one who investigates and prosecutes should not be the one who judges. The role that each person plays within their respective functions is not a mere formality; rather, it allows for real guarantees within the trial, such as the judge's fairness in their duties and equality of arms between the parties in the criminal process, so that due process is properly functioned and guaranteed, and not subject to bias or interference by the judge. In Ecuador, although the 2008 Constitution recognizes due process and requires judicial independence and impartiality, in practice, procedural flaws still occur when, under the guise of judicial direction of the process, the judge, instead of impartially presiding over the hearing, intervenes during the testimonial phase or in the presentation of arguments by the parties. This is where the problem arises, when this intervention ceases to be a control of the procedural order and begins to interfere with the content of the criminal trial. This research analyzes the true extent of judicial discretion and the limits that judges must exercise during hearings, and, above all, how far this discretion should extend within the Ecuadorian criminal process. The central point is that if judicial discretion is not exercised with clear limits and in a way that does not affect due process, it can lead to arbitrary decisions and, in more sensitive situations, bring the trial closer to practices typical of an investigative model, thus affecting due process and the quality of Ecuadorian criminal justice. This becomes especially delicate when judicial actions end up affecting, directly or indirectly, the development of the debate and the presentation of arguments; for example, if the judge guides how evidence is presented or even "corrects" XI flaws in the parties' case theory or litigation. Based on the 2008 Constitution, applicable criminal law and conventional standards ratified by the Ecuadorian State, as well as relevant jurisprudential criteria, this work proposes guidelines so that judicial direction is understood as a primarily formal, exceptional and restrictive power; useful to organize the procedure in criminal matters and ensure minimum rules of debate, but without replacing the parties or compromising the guarantee of due process and an impartial judge (Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, art. 76; Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code, 2014, art. 615.7; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2025).