Prohibición de prueba de ADN prenatal como vulneración del debido proceso del presunto padre.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the prohibition on the use of DNA testing on an unborn child, as expressly provided for in Article 10 of Title V, Chapter I of the Children and Adolescents, identifying those gaps in the regulations that impose obligations on the alleged father and create legal uncertainty, thereby violating the rights and obligations of the disputing parties in due process. The methodology of this research is a qualitative approach, employing a dogmatic- legal and socio-legal design through an exhaustive analysis of national regulations, specialized legal doctrine, case law, and representative case studies related to the application of DNA testing in paternity proceedings and child support cases. The results show that the regulatory shortcoming lies in the inability to perform DNA testing on an unborn child, despite technological advances and the fact that it would benefit the parties to have this information, both in terms of timing and conditions. The solution to this problem is to amend Article 10, Title V, Chapter I of the CONA and incorporate a procedure that guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the sample in cases involving a claim for child support for an unborn child, as well as in proceedings concerning child support for a pregnant woman.