La protección de los accionistas minoritarios frente al poder decisorio de la junta general de accionistas en las Sociedades Anónimas.

Abstract

It is understood that the decisions emanating from the General Meeting of the companies, are decisions that seek or lead to the wellbeing of society, being the ultimate goal of any capitalist society to produce profit, but since people engage in a society that is looking for the common good, we can see that in some cases the gool isn’t the good for everyone but for a few, or that some partners could not be satisfied with these decisions, that is why our Companies Law, framed in regulating the relationships of the participants of these societies under its control and surveillance, contemplates some guarantees that give security and support to the minority shareholders of the Corporations, but as time goes by, the behavior of the companies has varied and those mechanisms proposed by the Companies Law, may not be as effective as what is currently required. Therefore, this thesis deals with the lack of current legal tools that are necessary to protect the interests of minorities within a Stock Corporation against the decisions taken by the so-called General Meetings (majority government), which has led me to make, within the theoretical framework, a brief study of the forms of installation of the deliberative bodies from which decisions that undermine minority rights could emanate, as well as to review foreign legislation and to propose other mechanisms such as the suspension of contested resolutions, the right to veto and the right of the majority of minorities so that this defense of society can be strengthened in its broad sense, because those institutions that in our opinion could constitute possible solutions to the posed problem.