El análisis judicial de la culpabilidad penal : fundamentación tradicional y posterior a la reforma penal del 24 de diciembre del 2019.

Abstract

The purpose of this degree work is to analyze, under criteria of dogmatic-argumentative interpretation and jurisprudential analysis; as a different perspective to the traditional one, of the principle of criminal culpability, it can provide arguments to rethink the judicial analysis of the trial of reproach in a way in which the legal principles underlying this legal institution are better realized. One cannot cover up with seemingly modern infrastructures and political speeches, the fact that the disparity of judicial criteria exists; there are cases with similar assumptions in which the results are random and do not have the proper uniformity of criteria, which results in various results such as: convictions not due, acquittal sentences that should have been convicted, judicial decisions are given and unofficial prosecutors who determine a change in the imputation process that a criminal type must follow, etc. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop criteria of easy understanding and application, in order to obtain as a consequence the justice materialized in the uniformity of judicial and fiscal criteria when deliberating regarding the criminal legal guilt of the accused. For this, information from different bibliographical sources of jurists, regulatory bodies and jurisprudence applied to the specific case has been reviewed. We use a foundation of guilt proposed by the professor of the University of Seville Muñoz Conde consisting of conceptualizing guilt based on the human faculty of motivation; and, finally, the norms object of the last penal reform to the C.O.I.P. to highlight the coherence between these rules and the rationale for motivation versus a judicial practice marked by the traditional conception of guilt.